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The concept of American exceptionalism has recently been the target of 
heavy criticism. Implicit in "exceptionalism," critics claim, is an attempt 
to characterize American society as a unified whole, and in a completely 
multicultural society such as the American any talk of a national 
character makes little sense. Historian Joyce Appleby is one critic who 
has taken issue with American exceptionalism. In her presidential 
address to the Organization of American Historians in the spring of 1992, 
she described it as a version, or rather perversion, of European Enlighten- 
ment ideas. The grand narrative of American exceptionalism, she argued, 
has been "America's peculiar form of Eurocentrism." It has ignored the 
"original and authentic diversity" in America's past, especially the 
Colonial past, and has foreclosed "other ways of interpreting the meaning 
of the United States." It has cast into the shadows experiences of people 
whose errand has not been self-promotion and autonomy, and it has 
imbued with universality particular social traits - virtually all white and 
male. When looking at the American past and present through the lens of 
American exceptionalism, therefore, American historians and others 
have been blinded to the importance of the multicultural agenda, and the 
time has now come to move beyond exceptionalism "to recover the 
historic diversity of our past."] 
1 Joyce Appleby, "Recovering America's Historic Diversity: Beyond Exceptionalism". The Jo~~rnnl of 
Ailzerzcnn History, Sept. 1992, pp. 420,431. 
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For fashioning out of American exceptionalism an ideology that would 
unite all Americans, Appleby blames the country's lawyers. At the time 
of the Revolution, the few things that all Americans actually did have in 
common were British in origin and consequently had to be redefined. 
Among ordinary Americans, moreover, there existed no great wish to 
form "a more perfect union." What mattered to most people were local 
ties, local politics. When nationalist leaders, most of whom were lawyers, 
took it upon themselves to t ~ m i  American exceptionalism into a unifying 
ideology, they did not enjoy the support of the people: 
The case for a "more perfect union" was made in a lawyerly fashion by nationalist 
leaders, most of them lawyers. Outside of their circles, there were abroad in the land 
few corninon sentiments, fewer shared assuinptions operating at the intimate level of 
human experience, and a paucity of national syinbols recognizable from Georgia to 
Maine.= 
Appleby is not the only critic to point to the role of law and lawyers in the 
creation of an exceptional United States. Nor is she alone in criticizing 
the general unwillingness to deal with America's multicultural histories. 
Unlike some of her colleagues, however, Appleby fails to point out that 
American common law and judicial activism are an important part of the 
legacy of America's colonial past3 The very multiculturalism that she 
celebrates in her presidential address has been fostered by activist 
lawyers and judges, most notably in the Civil Rights movement. Down 
through American history, the law and the courts, by providing social 
definitions for events and transactions, and by extending citizenship to 
previously "unwanted" groups of people have constituted one of the few 
fora or "things" all Americans have in common. "Can a multicultural 
nation of nearly a quarter of a billion people be a community?," asks 
Kenneth Karst in Belonging to America. His answer is a resounding yes; 
being an American essentially means adhering to the American civic 
culture and behaving according to that culture's norms. Karst's civic 
culture is made up of five elements: individualism, egalitarianism, 
democracy, nationalism, and tolerance of diversity, and what ties these 
2 Ibid., p. 422. 
3 See e.g. Gordon S. Wood, "The Origins of Judicial Review." S~~ffollc University Law Review, Vol. 22, 
1988. 
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elements together is an ideology, "a creed that is both manifested in our 
constitutional doctrine and shaped by it."4 In Karst's version of American 
exceptionalism, that is, it is the law which translates ideology into 
behavior. 
Lawrence M. Friedinan has talked about an "American legal ~ul ture ,"~ 
Sanford Levinson about an American "faith community" centered around 
the ConstitutionG, and Mary Ann Glendon about American 'frights talk" 
and "law-riddenne~s"~ - others have referred to American legalism or 
legalization. Like Kenneth Karst, these commentators on American 
culture and society tend to see the law and its practitioners as protectors 
and translators into actual day-to-day behavior of American exceptional- 
ism. This article will argue that any discussion about American excep- 
tionalism will have to take into account the role of law and lawyers in 
American culture. Section one will focus, in a general and speculative 
way, on judicial activism - how it has been used, particularly since 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka in 1954, in the service of national 
community, to inake America more inclusive, and how its emphasis on a 
protection of rights and due process originates in the common law. 
As illustrations or case studies of how judicial activism worlts in 
practice, I shall then turn, in section two, to Melissa Fay Greene, Praying 
fqr Sheetrock (1991)8, and David L. Kirp, John P. Dwyer, and Larry A. 
Rosenthal, Our Town. Race, Housing, and the Soul of Suburbia (1995). 
The former is a study of how civil rights came to McIntosh County, 
Georgia in the 1970s, and the latter tells the story of the creation of 
something like a right to fair housing in New Jersey over a period of two 
decades. In both books, judicial activism markets "a very new com- 
modity: Law. For the poor"g - a commodity that seeks to de-segregate, to 
'include those who have hitherto not been seen as welcome additions to 
American society. 
4 Kenneth L. Karst, Belonging to Anzerica. Equal Citizenslzip aizd tlze Constitution (New Haven, CT.: Yale 
University Press, 1989), pp. 182,31. 
5 Lawrence M. Friedman, "American Legal Culture: The Last Twenty-Five Years," 35 St. Louis Law Journal 
529 (1991). This legal cnltme is defined as "the attitudes and expectations of the public with regard to law." 
G Sanford Levinson, Coizstitutioizal Faitlz (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988) 
7 Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk Tlze Iinpoverislzment of Political Discourse (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1991) 
8 Melissa Fay Greene, Prayiizgfor Sheetrock (N.Y.: Fawcett Columbine, 1991), p. 175. 
9 Praying for Sheetrock, p. 158. 
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In short, the arguments advanced by Kenneth Karst and other believers 
in American exceptionalism are ultimately more persuasive than are 
those of Joyce Appleby. 
In "The 'Hegelian Secret': Civil Society and American Exceptionalism," 
Daniel Bell argues first of all that it does make sense to talk about 
American differentness and secondly, that this differentness has to do 
with the United States being a "complete civil society, perhaps the only 
one in political history." By civil society Bell means a society in which 
individual self-interest and a passion for liberty reign supreme. In such a 
society, no institutional structures - no state in a European sense - have 
been created "to shape and enforce a unitary will over and above 
particular interests." What has taken the place of a state in the United 
States, Bell argues, is a government or political marltetplace, "an area in 
which interests contended (not always equally) and where deals could be 
made." The foundation for the American civil society has been 
inalienable, nat~~rally endowed rights inhering in each individual rather 
than in a group or a community of people, and institutions have been 
created for the purpose of protecting these rights. Among such institu- 
tions, the Supreme Court has played a very special and important role: 
Fortuitously, for it was not planned (nor were these powers specified in the 
Constitution), the Supreme Court became the final arbiter of disputes, and the 
mechanism for the adjustment of rules, which allowed the political marketplace to 
f~mction, subject to the amendment of the Constitution itself - which then again was 
interpreted by the court. The Constit~~tlon and the court became the bedrock of civil 
society. 
The Constitution, Bell suggests, has provided a social contract, 
a contract initially between the several states, yet transferred over time as a social 
contract between the government and the people. It may be the only successful social 
contract we know in political history, perhaps because the state was so weak and often 
non-existent.'O 
10 Daniel Bell, "The 'Hegelian Secret': Civil Society and American Exceptionalism." In Is America 
Different?; A New Look at American Exceptioiznlism, ed. Byron E. Shafer (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 
1991), pp. 60,66,62. 
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Americans have remained committed to constitutionalism and judicial 
activism. From the Supreme Court down, courts have generally been 
perceived to have a special responsibility as arbiters, even legitimators, 
of change. The degree of authority which American judges exercise is 
unparalleled among modern Western nations. Americans tend to take this 
for granted, writes Gordon S. Wood, 
but any foreign observer is immediately overwhelined by the extent to which the courts 
not only set aside laws passed by popularly elected legislatures but also interpret and 
construe the law in such a way as to make social policy. It is not simply the power of the 
Supreme Court, which tends to be the focus of our attention, but the power of all courts, 
both federal and state, to interprct tllc law in accordance with citl~er written constitu- 
tions or fundamental principles of justice and reason that is impressive. Nowhere else in 
the modern world do judges wield as mlch power in shaping the contours of life as they 
do in the United States." 
Law professors and political experts engage in lengthy and complicated 
discussions from time to time as to the desirability for a modern 
democracy of having the courts resolve issues that are essentially 
political.'* In other modern democracies issues concerning for example 
racial desegregation, abortion or the relationship between religion and 
the government would be looked upon as political matters which ought to 
be determined by parliamentary legislation.13 
When legal and political commentators criticize this exercise of 
judicial authority as unwarranted and issue warnings against judicial 
encroachment or usurpation, however, their criticism does not seem to 
meet with much approval from the general public. The staying power of 
judicial activism as well as of the most important "tool" with which the 
Supreme Court pursues its activist course, judicial review, "is an 
11 Gordon S. Wood., p. 1293. 
12 Cf. Geoffrey C. Hazard, who notes: "In case no one has noticed, it should be reported that these days 
some ve
r
y intense debates are going on in political and legal philosophy. These debates concern what our 
society should be like and how decisions about it should be made, and paticnlaly who should make those 
decisions. One of the priinay issues of those debates is the legitimacy of what lawyers and judges do, 
particularly appellate judges and more particnlar Supreme Court jnstices." ("Rising Above Principle," 
University of Pe~zizsylvnnia Law Review, Vol. 135, No. 1, p. 153) 
13 For an interesting recent attack on judicial activism see Snsan V. Demers, "The Failures of Litigation As 
a Tool for the Development of Social Welfare Policy." (Fordlzanz Urban Law Joz~u~zal, Vol. 22, 1995) 
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undeniable historical fact," according to Karst. He claims that we can talk 
about an American "natural-rights mentality" - a mentality that, "accom- 
panied by a receptiveness to judicial review, has stayed rooted in the 
popular folklore for reasons only indirectly related to democracy, either 
economic or p~litical."'~ As we shall see shortly, natural-rights doctrines 
such as substantive due process and its modern offshoots in the equal 
protection field have their origins in the common law. 
The Supreme Court first claimed the power of judicial review in 
Marbury v. Madison (1803). The practice of judicial review has been "so 
extraordinary, so pervasive, and so powerful, " however, claims Gordon 
Wood, that we have to look beyond this particular decision to the history 
of American jurisprudence and American legal culture as a whole to 
discover its origins. In colonial America, old beliefs in law as something 
discovered, not made, lingered on long after such beliefs had been 
effectively discredited in the mother country by positivist thinkers such 
as John Austin. The colonists "were much more conscious than their 
English cousins of the distinctiveness of the common law - as something 
set apart from statutory law and even from current English judicial 
decisions and precedents," and persisted in identifying the common law 
with "right reason or natural justice - with principles that existed apart 
from current English statutes and judicial  decision^."'^ 
The continued American preoccupation with the morality of law was a 
result of the ambiguities and complexities of colonial law. Judges had to 
take into consideration before handing down their decisions not only 
English legal sources (common-law reports, new judicial interpretations, 
and parliamentary statutes) but also local colonial statutes and judicial 
customs. Often, conditions would be so different in the New World that 
no suitable precedents could be found in English law, or local customs 
were so undeveloped that judges had to tale recourse to the immutable 
maxims of reason or justice. The extraordinary degree of judicial 
discretion that was needed under these circumstances paved the way for 
judicial review: 
14 Karst, p. 222. 
15 Wood, pp. 1296,1299. 
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Amidst tlie conf~~sion a d disorder of colonial law, lawyers and judges found that they 
had really no other basis except reason and equity for clarifying their law and for 
justifying their deviations from English practice. By resting their law on some principle 
beyond statutory will or tlie technicalities of the common law - on justice or common 
sense or utility - the colonists prepared the way for what we came to know as judicial 
review.I6 
With the exception of the infamous Dred Scott case in 1857, the Court 
made little use of its power to declare statutes unconstit~ltional until the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.I7 Prior to the Second World 
War, the Court reviewed mainly cases involving claims of economic 
right. It was only after the Second World War and in particular with 
Brown v. Board of Education that the Court started concentrating on the 
rights of the underprivileged. 
The truth is, that where rights pertaining to fair criminal procedure, equal legal 
treatment, free expression, or privacy are concerned, the United States Supreme Court 
has only a slightly longer experieiice than a great number of other nations. For us, too, 
the great expansion of personal liberties and civil rights began in the post-World War 
Two period.ls 
The Brown decision, says Karst, is "our leading authoritative symbol for 
the principle that the Constitution forbids a system of caste." With the 
Warren Court's decision in favor of racial equality, the principle of equal 
citizenship was revived. That principle had become formal law when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868. For almost a century, the 
Court had been reluctant to realize its potential, however, for fear of 
fundamentally changing the relation between the federal government and 
the states. When, after the Second World War, political leaders as well as 
the population at large showed a certain willingness to reconsider matters 
concerning race and equal citizenship, the Supreme Court responded. In 
the late 1940s and early '50s, the Court handed down a number of 
decisions that had been unimaginable only a few years earlier. 
16 Ibid., pp. 1302-03 
17 It should be noted, however, that the Court did strike down a number of state statutes before the Civil 
War. 
18 Glendon, p. 163. 
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The Justices who decided Brown v. Board of Education perceived the Fourteenth 
Amendment's guarantee of liberty and equality in the way every one of us perceives: 
through the filters created by the perceiver's acculturating experience. The Justices 
understood that the whole system of racial segregation was a betrayal of the central 
values of American civic culture. And political action, from the Niagara movement to 
the threatened inarch on Washington, had helped the Justices to ui~derstand.'~ 
The revival of equal citizenship in Brown amounted to a formal redefini- 
tion of the national community. When Chief Justice Warren wrote the 
opinion for the Court in the Brown cases, he recognized "the strong 
connection between the meaning of the Constitution and the national 
community of meaning that is the American civic culture." 
Of the five elements that make up Karst's civic culture, the most 
interesting - at least for the purposes of this paper - is nationalism. The 
civic culture defines the national community, Karst claims, and nobody 
has done more to uphold and protect that community than the country's 
judges. When activist, these judges, and especially the justices on the 
Supreme Court, have been nation-builders - the prime example being 
Brown, which expanded the meaning and actual contents of belonging. 
"Validation of a claim of equal citizenship is not merely important to the 
individual claimant. It also forms part of the social cement that makes the 
nation possible." When legislatures have defaulted, courts and lawyers 
have reacted, thereby providing a "cultural glue," a frame that may hold 
all Americcans together, however uneasily.20 
Courts have been in a better position than have legislatures to defend 
the principle of equal citizenship. Not subject to majoritarian domination, 
courts have generally been insulated from partisan politics. Their point of 
departure being concrete cases, moreover, judges have acquired a way of 
thinking that emphasizes prudence or practical wisdom. The training in 
practical wisdom starts in the country's law schools where students are 
exposed to the case method of instruction. What the case method 
essentially consists of, Anthony Kronman has argued, is forced role- 
playing. In reenacting concrete disputes by playing the roles of the 
19 Kxst,  pp. 74,73. -011 the Court's reluctance to embrace the potential of the Fourteenth Amendment, see 
Kast ,  chapter four. 
20 Ibid., pp. 18,10,29. 
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original parties and their attorneys, students learn to be sympathetic to a 
whole range of different points of view. Ultimately, it is the role of the 
j~ldge that is given priority. This has the effect, according to Kronman, of 
emphasizing the need to reach a "reasoned" and "publicly justifiable" 
conclusion to the problems at hand, thereby encouraging student interest 
in civic-mindednes~.~~ In American civil society or the political marltet- 
place where individual interests contend, it would thus seem, it has fallen 
to lawyers and judges to defend the public good. "If there are possibilities 
for some realization of the republican vision in today's polity, they 
appear to lie with the jud i~ ia ry ."~~ 
The use of law as an instrument of "policy" and social engineering is a 
reconstruction of the common law.23 Naturally preoccupied with the most 
basic requirements of the law, the common law has provided from the 
very outset a useful vocabulary in which to talk about conceptions of 
individually-centered justice. "As against the continental legal system 
with its powerful inquiring magistrates, Anglo-American legal procedure 
has been an adversarial one, with an emphasis on rights.7724 The common 
law and common-law judges have always been held in high esteem. Even 
though by far the majority of cases that reach the nation's courts are 
statute-law rather than common-law cases, American lawyers still tend to 
consider the common law the truest expression and repository of the most 
basic legal rights and principles. "Not even the most learned treatise can 
do justice to the fertility, variety, and ambiguity of the case law, its 
surprising ability to put out new shoots, or to turn an old theme to a fresh 
purpose. American judges at their best have been virtuosos of practical 
reason," as Glendon puts it.25 
The common law dates back to the twelfth century and possibly 
beyond. Its boundaries have always been defined by prevailing commun- 
21 Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer Failing Ideals of the Legal Professiolz (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 117. 
22 Karst, p. 225. 
23 See e.g. Harry H. Wellington, Irzte~-p~~etilzg the Coizstitution (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1990) and Lawrence H. Tribe and Michael C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvad 
University Press, 1991) for recent statements to the effect that modern, activist judicial review is an inevitable 
(and by and large desirable) effect of the common-law method of adjudication. 
24 Bell, 11. 59. 
25 Glendon, p. 169. 
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ity standards. What gave authority to the common law as a legal order 
entitled to the highest respect was the belief that it embodied centuries of 
human wisdom. Emphasizing continuity and peaceful incorporation of 
change rather than sudden and violent reform, and residing in the 
customs of the community rather than in the political system, the 
common law understood law as developing out of and along with the 
people. "Law by and large evolves; it changes in piecemeal fashion. 
Revolutions in essential structure are few and far between. That at least is 
the Anglo-American experience. Some of the old is preserved among the 
mass of the 
What all common lawyers share is "an emphasis on the ongoing 
cultivation of a concrete historical tradition.7727 This ongoing, dynamic, 
and incomplete tradition encompasses both theory and practice. The 
common law does not consist only of the legal doctrines derived from 
binding official legal sources such as statutes and precedents. Under the 
institutional principles that govern the common law, what Melvin 
Eisenberg calls "social propositions" - propositions of morality, policy, 
and experience - are relevant in all cases. One of the key questions in 
common-law reasoning concerns precisely the interaction of social and 
doctrinal propositions, and it is not difficult, Eisenberg claims, to see why 
such propositions must necessarily play an important part in common- 
law reasoning. 
The common law is heavily concerned with the intertwined concepts of injuries and 
rights, and moral norms largely shape our perception of what constit~ltes an injury and 
a right. Judicial considerations of policies furthers the courts' function of enriching the 
supply of legal rules: if the courts are to establish legal rules to govern future social 
conduct, it is desirable for them to consider whether those rules will conduce to a good 
or a bad state of affairs. Experimental considerations are necessary to mediate between 
policies and moral norins on the one hand and legal rules on the other.28 
Not any and every social proposition is acceptable, however. Only 
"applicable social propositions" that it is "proper for a court to employ" 
26 Lawrence M. Friedman. A History ofAnzericarz Law (N.Y. Simon & Schuster, 1973), p. 14. 
27 Bmce Ackennan, We the People. Fo~~ndntions (Cambridge, Mass.: Havard University Press, 1993), p. 
24. 
28 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Nature o f  the Common Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Havard University Press, 
1988), pp. 1-2. 
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will And consensus as to what constitutes "proper" social, non-legal 
propositions is no longer as stable as it used to be. For some, e.g., the 
legal positivists, social propositions ought to be discarded altogether, 
whereas for others, such as the members of the Critical Legal Studies and 
Critical Race Theory Movements, legal doctrines are hardly worth 
considering entities in and of their own right but only make sense in 
connection with social propositions. More often than not, though, the 
question is one of degree rather than kind - what weight to give to each 
of the respective propositions. What concerns us here is the fact that the 
common law is, in its very nature, both material and ideological. 
That the common law is not merely fact, but also inevitably has an 
intellectual and moral dimension, has to do with law being "custom 
transformed, and not merely the will or reason of the lawmaker. Law 
spreads upward from the bottom and not only downward from the top."30 
What happens at the grass-roots level carries importance for decisions 
made at the top. Reflecting and defending on the one hand the interest of 
the ruling class, on the other hand the law has provided protection against 
the mis~lse of power of that very class. 
Law not only expresses and creates power but also serves to limit power - -Law 
expresses community norms and it applies them to particular situations by interpreting 
the norms in the light of community morality and other comm~ulity understandings. 
The essence of a norm is that it constrains behavior, including the behavior of the 
powerful.31 
It is in this doubly dualist nature of the common law, as it were - its 
being material but also ideological, and its spreading upward from the 
bottom and not merely downward from the top - that we may find the 
origins of judicial activism. In many ways, contemporary judges are 
merely doing what generations of common-law judges have done before 
them: making law with the self-conscious goal of bringing about social 
change. 
29 Ibid., pp. 1-2,43. 
30 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolutioiz. The Fornzatioiz of the Westem Legal Tradition (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Haward University Press, 1983), p. 556. 
31 Karst, p. 194. 
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Appleby would not find much support for her attack on American 
exceptionalism among the general public. As already mentioned, most 
Americans find in the very notion of American exceptionalism - and 
especially in its legal underpinnings - a viable path to effective inclusion 
in American society. This is reflected in the nation's cultural life. From 
the works of Scott Turow, John Grisham and countless other writers of 
detective novels, or television series such as "The People's Court" and 
"L. A. Law," to the works of "serious" writers such as William Gaddis 
and Margaret Atwood, the sacred principles of personal freedoms and 
rights as outlined in the Constitution are invariably invoked above or 
beyond the actual plots. A person's decency and human worth are tested 
against whether or not he or she still - deep-down - believes in the 
American civic culture. If and when the average American stops 
believing in American exceptionalism and stops wanting to fight for it, 
these cultural works suggest, then things do not look good. 
One revealing example is the story of a small Southern community's 
awakening to civil rights in the 1970s - a story told in Praying for 
Sheetrock by Melissa Fay Greene. The development that takes place 
within just one generation is one from church to court. As the book 
unfolds, the devoutly Christian black community of McIntosh County, 
Georgia, who have been "blind and deaf to issues of civil equality, equal 
employment, and local corruption," discover that the law and its 
practitioners may actually be of more help to them in their fight for 
justice and equality than their church leaders.32 
In the early 1970s, McIntosh County is a completely segregated 
community. Tom Poppell, the white sheriff, wields all power; he controls 
everyone and everything. He has been sheriff since 1948, when he 
inherited the office from his father, Sheriff Ad Poppell, and he rules 
McIntosh in much the same way that George Washington P l u h t t  once 
ruled New York7s Tammany Hall: by "honest graft." In return for votes, 
he protects and takes care of his constituents. He is famous all over the 
South, for example, for allowing the local population to loot the cargo 
spilled onto old U.S. 17 through McIntosh County whenever trucks 
collide or suffer the mishaps of heavy interstate traffic. Oftentimes, such 
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mishaps will be caused by Sheriff Poppell himself and his deputies, who 
will take possession of the scene and call in the locals once the truck 
driver has gone off in search of help. "Such redistribution of wealth," we 
are told, "invariably put the sheriff in an excellent mood" and earns him 
"ever-widening circles of  supporter^."^^ 
Like most successful political bosses, Tom Poppell is a wealthy man. 
He has acquired his wealth in a number of illegal business transactions 
over the years. During his reign, McIntosh County has been converted 
into "a mini-Las Vegas, a mini-Atlantic City, a southern Hong Kong or 
Bangkok where white men came looking for, and found, women, gamb- 
ling, liquor, drugs, guns, sanctuary from the law, and boats available for 
~muggl ing ."~~ The locals do not condone Poppell's activities; indeed, 
most are sorry for the bad reputation these activities bring to McIntosh. 
Yet, by playing Robin Hood from time to time and tossing the occasional 
bonus to law-abiding whites and blacks alike, Poppell has managed to 
stay in power, thereby continuing one of the longest-running sheriff's 
dynasties in the state's history. 
Between the black and the white communities of McIntosh, there are 
"close and long-time connections - unlike anything in the North." Half 
of the population are white and for the most part they live in Darien, 
where they own all the major shops and businesses and occupy all the 
important offices. All the menial tasks are performed by the blacks, the 
majority of whom still inhabit slave or sharecropper shacks to the north 
of Darien between the shoreline and the pine woods. They live their lives 
much as they have since emancipation, trusting in the Lord to provide 
for their needs and relying on the sheriff to maintain the racial equilib- 
rium. 
The historic black community of McIntosh lived in a sort of pale outside a century of 
American progress and success. They survived by raising vegetables and keeping 
chickens and pigs, by worlung menial jobs in Darien, and by fishing the network of 
tidewater rivers and blackwater swamps. They lived without plumbing, telephones, hot 
water, paved roads, electricity, gas heat, or air-conditioning into the 1 9 7 0 ~ . ~ ~  
33 Ibid., pp. 3,241. 
34 Ibid., p. 14. 
35 Ibid., pp. 16-17,20. 
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When finally the call for civil rights disrupts the silent understanding 
between blacks and whites in McIntosh, everybody - blacks and whites 
alike - has a hard time understanding how acquaintances, people they 
have known all their lives, now turn into adversaries. It all starts when 
Thurnell Alston, an uneducated and unemployed black man with a keen 
sense of justice, has finally had it. Years before lie first hears about 
Martin Luther King and his fight for racial equality, Thurnell starts 
becoming conscious of the systematic attacks on his own dignity and that 
of his black brothers. In "a series of rude awakenings" - one of which 
consists of his overhearing Sheriff Poppell remarlung how the "only way 
you can control the Negroes is to keep them hungry" - Thurnell under- 
goes a gradual, but effective "education," "until the day he had heard and 
seen enough and could not, in good conscience, remain passive any 
longer. "36 
What turns Thurnell's passive knowledge of racial discrimination into 
an active will to figlit for change is the senseless shooting of a black man 
named Ed Finch by Darien's white chief of police, Guy Hutchinson. 
Annoyed at Finch, who is engaged in a drunken and loud quarrel with his 
girlfriend on the hunt porch of her house and refuses to be quiet when 
Chief Hutchinson tells him to, the Chief simply sticks his revolver into 
Finch's mouth and fires. He then takes Finch, bleeding, to the jail, 
charges him with aggravated assault and drunk and disorderly conduct 
and leaves him without any medical attention. What chiefly upsets the 
black community is not so much the fact that a violent act is committed 
by a white person against a black neighbor - after all, the black 
community is used to far worse! - but rather the fact that all of this 
happens in broad daylight within a residential area. 
Clearly an attack such as Hutchinson's upon Finch was not allowed: the blaclts were 
not, after all, to be slaughtered like hogs; the fiction was to be maintained of two 
separate societies living rather gingerly side-by-side, each with its own hub of social 
and business life. Such a vicious and unprovolted attack by the chief of police against a 
citizen was a violation of the unspoken social contract that allowed the whites and the 
outcast blacks to live in peace.37 
36 Ibid., p. 38. 
37 Ibid., p. 122 
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The night Chief Hutchinson shoots Ed Finch, black McIntosh gathers 
around Thurnell Alston, and from now on it is Thurnell to whom they 
turn for advice and leadership. Thurnell teams up with two old pals, 
Reverend Nathaniel Grovner and Sammie Pinkney. Together, these 
"Three Musketeers" set out to do something. For various reasons, all 
three of them have independent sources of income and thus need fear no 
economic reprisal from the sheriff and the rest of white McIntosh. They 
hold meetings, around Th~mlell's kitchen table, but also in church where 
they try to raise the political consciousness of their devoutly Christian 
black brothers and sisters. At some point, Sammie Pinlney, who as a 
former New Yorlt City policeman with experience of the American West 
and of Europe ltnows about the ways of the world, becomes impatient, 
however. Alston and Grovner's reiterating every evening in church "the 
same half-dozen painful facts" which are then swept away by the 
congregation "with another mighty hymn," does not get them any- 
where.38 Outside intervention is needed, Pinkney decides, so he contacts 
Georgia's controversial legal aid network, the Georgia Legal Services 
Program and hires a lawyer. 
Alston and Grovner are not immediately persuaded that the move from 
church to court is a wise one. Not long after their first appointment at the 
Brunswick Legal Services office, however, they find themselves 
commuting back and forth between McIntosh and Brunswick nearly 
every day. The meeting with the young legal aid lawyers, whom they 
initially view with much skepticism, turns out to be a revelation: 
The amazing thing, to Thurnell, was how quickly and easily the young white lawyers 
had named the ill health of the co~ulty; how they had listened as the three McTntosh men 
tumbled out their tales of poverty, underemployment, and a sense of being the 
.. untouchables in McIntosh's caste system - It was as if he'd come to them delirious, a 
feverish child, and they had smoothed his hair, laid a cold cloth on his forehead, and 
explained to him that he had the mumps and this was the cherry syrup he must sip from 
a spoon to be all better.39 
Time and again, Thurnell and his fellow-Musketeers hear the white 
lawyers talk about and refer to one particular document: the American 
38 Ibid., 13. 151. 
39 Ibid., pp. 178-79. 
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Constitution. This document, the lawyers promise, has something to say 
about every fight for equality - even when that fight occurs in such a far- 
away and seemingly insignificant place as McIntosh County, Georgia. 
The Constitution, the blaclc men soon come to understand, 
was the white boys' Bible; and the lawyers quoted it often, chapter and verse, talting 
secular pleasure in its ornate language every bit as much as the rural people relished the 
antiquated resonance of biblical thou shalts and wherefores and coineths and goet11s.~~ 
For their part, the young white lawyers rejoice in the chance to leave their 
offices in Brunswiclc and do some active service in the black community. 
Fresh out of the nation's best law schools, these "young, upper-middle- 
class, mostly urban, mostly Yankee lawyers" have no idea what awaits 
them in the South. They are taken aback by the Third World conditions 
under which people, white and blaclc, are still living and consider the 
challenges they meet in Georgia "akin to those of their friends who had 
joined the Peace Corps instead of VISTA and who now dwelled in Asian 
or African villages. The exoticism and foreignness of the surroundings 
were vivid, and they themselves were looked upon as bizarre implants." 
Their social commitment is genuine and deep-felt. They had gone to law 
school in the first place out of a desire to perform public service, and 
consider a legal career the best instrument for creating social change. 
Their will to a judicially activist life is founded on an understanding of 
law as "self-evident truths about fundamental human rights," and when 
they set up shop in the small rural towns, they are "prepared to work 
heroic hours ."41 
The course upon which the lawyers decide to embark is to bring suit in 
federal court, contending that the electoral system for electing city and 
council officers presently in operation in the city of Darien and McIntosh 
County, respectively, dilute the votes of black citizens. The NAACP v. 
McIntosh County is resolved with a consent order, which divides 
McIntosh into five voting precincts. As for the second voting rights suit, 
The NAACP v. The City of Darien, the Georgia Legal Services Program 
lawyers fail to convince Judge Alaimo of the Southern District that 
40 Ibid., p. 180. 
41 Ibid., pp. 161,156. 
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anything is wrong with the way the city of Darien runs its elections, and 
the judge dismisses the suit. The legal aid lawyers appeal. This time they 
win; in October, 1979 the U S .  Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
reverses, "and Darien, like McIntosh before it, was sliced into districts, 
inchding a majority-black d i s t r i~ t . "~~  
The way is now paved for black citizens to run for both city and 
council officers. The first to benefit from the court order that has created 
a majority-black district is Thurnell Alston. Running, at age forty-one, 
for county commissioner for the fourth time, he finally succeeds in 
placing himself squarely in tlie midst of McIntosh County politics. 
Politically, he is a success, forcing the white commissioners to dedicate 
the sparse budget to the most fundamental needs of the poor. What 
Thurnell has not anticipated, however, is that after his election, the black 
community, tired of fighting and wishing merely to go back to their lives, 
lose interest in him and his continued struggles with the white 
commissioners. 
In a strange collapse of vision, the election of Thurnell Alston to the County 
Commission now appeared to everyone to be the chief thing they had worked for, the 
ultimate victory - -He became, to the black people, simply the Coinmissioner; not the 
Barber, not the Undertaker, not the Preacher, but the Commissioner, as if tlie larger 
community had no more vested interest in his daily work than in anyone el~e 's .~3 
Without the support of the close-knit black community, Thurnell is lost. 
None of what he has fought so hard for over the past years, seems worth 
it. When furthermore he and his wife suffer the loss of a favorite son, 
Thurnell feels so alienated, so tired and depressed that he starts loafing 
and drifts in the direction of the criminal milieu in McIntosh. He is 
indicted on charges of accepting bribes and possessing and distributing 
drugs and eventually has to go to jail. 
"What might have happened differently," muses one of the young 
white lawyers as the two voting rights suits are about to be filed, "if 
Sammie and Thurnell and Reverend Grovner - had contacted say, polit- 
ical organizers, the national NAACP or SNCC. There might have been a 
42 Ibid., p. 219. 
43 Ibid., p. 253. 
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different approach to this stuff. But they came to lawyers, you know, 
what can you do?"44 The question as to whether the course of events 
would have been a different one, had the Three Musketeers decided to 
fight in the political rather than, the legal arena, is never addressed by 
Melissa Fay Greene. In fact, the author of Praying for Sheetrock does not 
even seem to find it a relevant question. The reader cannot help 
wondering if the backing of a political group or organization might not 
have prevented Thurnell's sad fall from grace. As far as Greene is 
concerned, however, the real heroes are the lawyers whose judicial 
activism makes it possible for Thurnell to embark on a political career in 
the first place. As the book closes, a black man has replaced Thurnell as 
county commissioner, a black woman is elected to the post of 
superintendent of education, another black woman runs the tourism 
office, and yet a third black woman teller works in Darien's bank. Of 
course, says Greene, "it is not enough, but it is a beginning."45 
Like Praying for Sheetrock, David L. Kirp, John P. Dwyer, and Larry A. 
Rosenthal's Our Town. Race, Housing, and the Soul of Suburbia is about 
the use of law to make America more inclusive. As the title implies, the 
issue discussed in the more recent book is zoning and its implications for 
the racial make-up of America's suburban landscape. We are in Mount 
Laurel, New Jersey - a state, we are told, which is the most suburbanized 
state in the nation, and in which judicial activism is "the byword," New 
Jersey's Supreme Court Justices having been "more openly political and 
politically strategic in their decrees than other states' judges."46 
The story of Mount Laurel - the township and the landmark case - 
begins on a Sunday in 1970, when the congregation of the all-black 
African Methodist Episcopalian Church has invited the Mayor of Mount 
Laurel to announce the town's response to a housing proposal which will 
open up suburban Mount Laurel to local, poor and mostly black families. 
After praising the new prosperity that is fast changing small rural Mount 
Laurel into a booming suburb the Mayor comes to the point: the township 
44 Ibid., p. 175. 
45 Ibid., pp. 175,335. 
46 David L. Kirp, John P. Dwyer, and Larry A. Rosenthal, Our Town. Race, Ho~isirzg, and the Sozd of 
Suburbia (New Br~mswiclc, N.J.: Rntgers University Press, 1995), 13. 65. 
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has no intention of ever approving the proposed housing project. Indeed, 
he goes on, " 'if you people' - you poor and black people, that is - 'can't 
afSord to live in our town, then you'll just have to leave'."47 These words 
are like a slap in the face to the blaclts present; the Mayor as good as tells 
them that for them and their families, whose roots in Mount Laurel after 
all go back to before the American Revolution, there is no room. This 
leaves them no option but to move to the riot-torn slums of nearby 
Camden. 
Appalled at Mount Laurel's rejection of the idea of housing for the 
poor, the minister of the African Methodist Episcopalian Church 
approaches Camden's radical Legal Services lawyers. Upon hearing 
about the Mayor's message to the black population of Mount Laurel, the 
Camden lawyers decide "to bring their equalitarian agenda to the 
suburbs." Like their colleagues in Praying for Sheetrock, these lawyers 
had gone to law school in the sixties, not with the intention of becoming partners in 
some st~rffy Wall Street firm, but instead meaning to accomplish a quiet social 
revoltrtion in the nation's courtrooms. These children of the Warren Court era regarded 
the law almost as a secular religion, and they had faith in its power to undo injustice.48 
With the involvement of the Camden Legal Services lawyers, the housing 
controversy ceases to be a matter for the citizens of Mount Laurel to 
settle among themselves. For the lawyers, affordable housing is a matter 
of simple justice, and they see in the Mount Laurel controversy a 
potential "frontal challenge to the ever widening divisions between 
blacks and whites, as well as between the poor and everyone else." 
Together with local community organizers they decide to take the contro- 
versy to the courts, contending that Mount Laurel's zoning ordinance 
unconstitutionally excludes poor and minority citizens from affluent 
neighborhoods. Among the local organizers, it is especially a black 
woman by the name of Ethel Lawrence with whom the lawyers 
deliberate, as they pursue their legal course. Ethel Lawrence is the 
Thurnell Alston of Our Town. The book is dedicated to her for, as the 
authors put it, without her it "would have been simply an account of how 
47 Ibid., p. 2. 
48 Ibid., pp. 3,70 
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policy gets made, not a textured human drama as well." It is Ethel who 
first educates the authors on "the folk-ways and law-ways" of New 
Jersey, just as it is her constant presence in court which serves to remind 
attorneys and judges that real people, not just legal principles, are 
involved.49 
When the lawyers file Southern Burlington County NAACP et al. v. 
Township of Mount Laurel in May 1971, they have no idea that Mount 
Laurel, as the zoning litigation comes to be collectively known, will 
continue to be argued in court for a decade and a half, and will become 
"the Roe v. Wade of fair housing, the Brown v. Board of Education of 
exclusionary zoning." The first to hear the case is trial court judge 
Edward Martino. Judge Martino is so overwhelmed by the stories told in 
court' by the township's poor of neglect and abuse on the part of Mount 
Laurel's politicians, that he pronounces Mount Laurel's zoning ordinance 
unconstitutional on grounds of economic discrimination. Writing his 
opinion, Martino has to do some creative legal thinking as he has no New 
Jersey precedent to rely on. Instead, he "cobbled together an opinion that 
relied on dissents, decisions from other states, and law review comment- 
ar~."~O 
Judge Martino's opinion, delivered in May 1972, is bold, though not as 
bold as the judgment delivered three years later by Justice Frederick Hall 
for a unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court. Upon the township's appeal 
of the trial court's ruling, the Supreme Court decides to hear the case 
directly, skipping the intermediate appellate court. Picking up on Judge 
Martino's notion of economic discrimination, Justice Hall speaks of a 
moral obligation on the part of America's suburbs toward the poor and 
homeless and demands that "developing towns across the state rewrite 
their zoning laws so that private developers, taking advantage of federal 
subsidies and market forces, could build homes for a 'fair share' of the 
region's poor and moderate-income fa mi lie^."^^ As had been the case for 
Judge Martino before him, Justice Hall has no specific text other than the 
New Jersey Constitution's vaguely formulated concern for the general 
49 Ibid., pp. 70,ix. 
50 Ibid., pp. 3,75. 
51 Ibid., p. 77. 
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welfare to rely on in his call for constitutionally mandated municipal 
obligations. 
The politicians are enraged at Justice Hall's demand for an ordinance 
providing "realistic opportunity" for affordable housing. They refuse to 
play this game of "judicial dictatorship" and submit a "farcical docu- 
ment, every bit as defiant of the judiciary as southern school districts' 
responses to desegregation in the 1950s and 1960s." To the lawyers' 
dismay, the trial court approves of the town's sham zoning changes, and 
they decide to mount a new Mount Laurel lawsuit. In Mount Laurel II, as 
the suit comes to be known, they are defeated at the trial court level, but 
vindicated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1983. The opinion 
delivered by Chief Justice Robert Wilentz himself gives "developers, 
lawyers, and poor families eager to prise open the suburbs expansive 
declarations of rights, detailed remedies to make those rights real, and 
even the apparatus of a new mini-administrative system to enforce 
them."52 
The lawyers rejoice in Chief Justice Wilentz' public interest-oriented 
call for each town to take affirmative responsibility for its "fair share" of 
the state's poor. As it turns out, they rejoice too soon, however. Prodded 
into action by Wilentz' specific warning in Mount Laurel II that the 
Supreme Court will continue its judicial activism until the Legislature 
acts, members of the State Legislature start negotiating a compromise. 
After several failed attempts at reconciling liberal hopes of preserving in 
legislation the most central elements of Mount Laurel II and conservative 
plans of aborting the court's ruling, the Legislature finally produce the 
1985 Fair Housing Act. Along the way, Republican Governor Thomas 
Kean has done his best to transform "the fair-share problem Mount 
Laurel I1 had addressed into another kind of problem - runaway 
judges."53 
The 1985 Fair Housing Act, it is generally understood, sends an 
unequivocal signal to the New Jersey Supreme Court that f~lrther judicial 
activism is neither needed nor wanted. It takes the high court barely six 
months to respond. In February 1986, in a case formally known as Hills 
52 Ibid., pp. 86-87,93. 
53 Ibid., pp. 101,123. 
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Development v. Bernarcls Township but more commonly called M~~~~ 
Laurel III, the Supreme Court unanimously upholds the new law. T~ 
some, this is a realistic, even pragmatically wise peace offering from the 
bench; to Ethel Lawrence and the Legal Services lawyers, who have 
made the cause of affordable housing central to their lives over the years, 
Mount Laurel III amounts to retreat, even capitulation on the Justices' 
part. 
In the assessment of the authors of Our Town, neither response is 
entirely fair. The New Jersey Supreme Court must be commended first of 
all for forcing the Legislature to recognize the state's responsibility to 
solve the housing needs of the poor, and secondly for knowing exactly 
how far to pursue a legally activist course without loosing its autonomy 
and integrity. Unlike what has happened in other states where justices 
have been forced to resign for being too openly political, New Jersey's 
justices "have continued to be legal innovators, and appointments to the 
Supreme Court still stress professional competence, not partisan 
politics." On the other hand, Mount Laurel III raises questions about the 
high court's willingness and ability to keep a reform agenda going. Just 
as the court had demonstrated, in Mount Laurel II, a willingness to "craft 
broad remedies for systemic social problems and transcend the 
limitations of traditional litigation," it draws back and leaves the issue of 
affordable housing in the hands of New Jersey's politicians for whom the 
needs of the prosperous middle class have always been more important 
than those of the poor. The unfortunate result has been that Justice Hall's 
talk, in Mount Laurel I, of a moral obligation toward Mount Laurel's 
poor, essentially black population, has been conveniently forgotten, and 
that "there has been relatively little low- and moderate-income housing 
built in New Jersey since the Fair Housing Act was passed in 1985."54 
For a brief moment, it looks as if a handful of judicially activist 
justices may succeed in forcing Middle America to commit itself to the 
principle of fair shares for the Haves and the Have-Nots alike. But then 
the justices retreat from "that bold new conception of the common- 
wealth," allowing Middle America to slip back into its old beliefs in the 
power of a free market economy to resolve America's problems. Our 
54 Ibid., pp. 147,113,159. 
Town is very much about judicial activism - its potential for "defining 
and enforcing newly created social rights and obligations." Above and 
beyond the issue of whether affordable housing is a matter for the 
judiciary or for the legislature, however, it is the actual - and very real - 
needs of the poor, the human problem, that concerns the authors. At a 
time when "the very idea of our being a 'good society,' a city on a hill, 
commands little credence," and when "compassion, once a byword, has 
become a political liability," Kirp, Dwyer and Rosenthal ask, to whom 
are the poor going to look for support? Until Middle America finally 
wakes up and recognizes that help is needed, "it is vital that the idealists 
keep talking the talk."55 And for the time being there seem to be more 
idealists among America's judges than among its politicians. 
Down through American history, the common law has served as a basis 
for social and political inclusion. As some critics see it, the inclusiveness 
enabled by the common law has had the unfortunate effect of 
undermining multicultural identity. According to Appleby it is the very 
inclusiveness of the common law, and not merely its use as a tool of 
WASP exclusivity, that has threatened multiculturalism. To such attacks 
on legal universalism, other critics have responded that legal univer- 
salism has in fact enabled the nation's subcultures to seek and obtain 
integration. Karst is one such critic who has attempted in his writing to 
demonstrate that, 
not every form of 'legal universalism' threatens to undermine the nation's subcult~u-es. 
To one who self-identifies within a culture or a social group partly or wholly defined by 
race or sexual orientation, equal citizenship implies that she can belong to America and 
at the same time keep that particularized orientation if she wants it. An increasing 
recognition of the mythical qualities of racial or sexnal orientation identity should make 
no difference at all to the antidiscrimination component of the guarantee of equal 
citizenship. Nor should the recognition of race as a myth be taken to undermine the 
constitutional or statutory foundation for race-conscious group remedies that are 
appropriate for group-based harms. In the end, both the antidiscrimination principle and 
race-conscious remedies should be seen as the instiuinents of integration. Not 
'assimilation' in the sense of identity lost, but integration in the sense of a reality 
renamed, an identity renewed, a myth retold.56 
55 Ibid., pp. 173,79,174. 
56 Kenneth L. Kasst, ''Myth of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and Sexual Orientation," 
UCLA Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 2, 1995, p. 369. 
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Karst's attempt to combine in his work legal universalism with the search 
for particularized identification, in which so many of America's diverse 
cultures have been engaged over the past many years, is an important and 
interesting one. It is one, moreover, which is reflected in a variety of 
American c~lltural works. Two recent examples are Praying for Sheetrock 
and Our Town. For Thurnell Alston and Ethel Lawrence the fight to be 
included into American society is a long and arduous one. Not knowing 
at first where to turn for support and understanding, they approach the 
Legal Services Programs of their respective states. The idealism and 
willingness to fight for a better and more just society that characterize the 
young white lawyers who man these programs impress the two 
protagonists. As they befriend these lawyers, they cannot help but being 
swept along by the lawyers' belief in the law's ability to do good. The law 
of the land, they come to believe, is there for them too. 
Central to the authors of Praying for Sheetrock and Our Town is the 
belief in judicial activism - the belief that in a civil society the courts will 
have to step in to protect the rights of the underprivileged. Both books 
illustrate how intimately the idea of American exceptionalism is related 
to the role of law and lawyers in American society. It is especially since 
World War I1 that Americans have come to associate judicial activism 
with an expansion of constit~ltional rights for America's needy. Earlier, 
the country's activist judges were not always instrumental in extending 
the rights of citizenship to previously unwanted groups of people. After 
Brown, however, the ideal of a compassionate and activist judiciary has 
served to remind the nation that what makes America exceptional are not 
only certain constitutional rights and liberties, but also the very idea that 
such rights are for everybody - high and low, white and non-white, man 
and woman. When therefore critics such as Appleby attack the notion of 
American exceptionalism for excluding down through American history 
all that is non-white and non-male, they miss the point. 
